In this paper, we describe privacy-preserving protocols for a scheduling service in eHealth applications. We are integrating our proposal into a pervasive home assistance system that allows patients or elderly people to stay longer at home. This pervasive eHealth system offers a multitude of services to its users, such as health monitoring, communication with caregivers, but also assigning requested tasks to appropriate caregivers. The scheduling mechanism that we propose protects sensitive information that is handled by the system. However, it still allows for a fair distribution of tasks and restricting the task assignment to caregivers with specific qualifications. Therefore, this service can be offered by a commercial company without fear for privacy issues.
Introduction
During the past decades, there has been a persistent trend in the age demographics of the developed countries. The average age of individuals is steadily increasing, and consequently there is a growing number of elderly that require daily help and possibly constant health monitoring. The guardians of the elderly are often not in a position to provide this kind of continuous assistance. Therefore, the potential of eHealth systems to provide efficient and cost-effective care in the home was recognized quite early. These systems can allow elderly or patients to stay longer in their households, rather then being moved to nursing homes and hospitals. This is also complementary to their reluctance to leave home and is therefore well perceived.
In order to sustain this form of independence of the elderly or patients, the home assistance systems should provide a wide range of services. These include continuous monitoring of health parameters, their automatic assessment and detection of anomalies, remote access to this data by authorized medical personnel, and communication with the caregivers. In addition to this, the patients or elderly need to be able to request assistance and these specific tasks should be assigned to their caregivers in a fair way. Examples are regular doctors' visits, catering or cleaning services, assistance with administering medication, etc. This assignment is usually performed by a close relative of the patient. However, this can be a great burden, as last minute changes also need to be handled in the most appropriate manner, which requires continuous engagement. As a solution, this task can be delegated to the eHealth system. Of course, for a pervasive system that will handle sensitive patient's data, such as health parameters or contacts with caregivers, one of the most important requirements is protection of the privacy. Therefore, we are proposing privacy-preserving protocols that describe the scheduling service in a pervasive eHealth system. Additionally, the proposed protocols surpass the need to disclose any identifying information to the scheduling service, which allows for it to be offered by a commercial entity. However, the patients are still able to specify required skills and medical qualifications and their preferences regarding caregivers. The system is also able to handle last-minute changes.
The contribution of this paper is the design of a few protocols, that allow the integration of an (optimizing) scheduling service into a pervasive but privacy-friendly eHealth system. In current eHealth systems or research, privacy is either not an issue or is at best protected through an access control mechanism. However, accidental or malignant leakage of privacy-sensitive data (e.g. by hackers or employees) can be detrimental to the patient's privacy. In our system, we can guarantee that such leakage cannot occur. However, it does not prevent that advanced services (such as a scheduling service) are integrated into the system. All the necessary information is available, but it is only accessible to authorized caregivers that are directly involved with the patient's care.
In the following text we will no longer distinguish between the elderly and stay-at-home patients and denote both by the term 'patient'.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview of the related work in Sect. 2. Next, Sect. 3 briefly describes the architecture and the functionality of the pervasive home assistance system. In Sect. 5 the scheduling service is described -the creation and handling of schedules, allocation of tasks and notification of caregivers. The proposed mechanism is evaluated in Sect. 6. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Sect. 7.
Related work
There is a significant body of research focusing on eHealth systems in the home. They provide for monitoring of health parameters with unobtrusive wearable sensors and detecting anomalies. Most research approaches focus on the development of the monitoring equipment, i.e. the body area sensor network. Some proposals also develop protocols that protect the privacy of the patients' personal (medical) data [6, 10] . A pervasive eHealth system, however, needs to provide a variety of services to the patients. One of them is the scheduling service, which is not fully tackled in the previous approaches. An agent-based medical appointments scheduling system for mobile users is proposed in [8] . However, the privacy issues are not addressed in the approach. On the other hand, nurse rostering and patient admission scheduling problems were also investigated as a part of classical healthcare systems [2, 3] . In order to automate these tasks optimally, various criteria need to be taken into account [9] . Different models that are proposed try to provide a general solution [5] , or focus only on a specific scenario [1] . These algorithms are complementary to our research, as they can be used by the scheduling service to optimize the allocation of tasks, i.e. all the necessary information can be provided by our system, except for the identities of the entities involved. In our proposal we investigate how this service could be integrated in a privacy-preserving manner into a pervasive eHealth system.
The system architecture
A pervasive home assistance system needs to provide a wide range of services to its users, in order to offer complete care. The examples are monitoring of health parameters, communication with the caregivers 3 , scheduling patient-requested tasks and logging of actions and events, which are used in case of problems or disputes. The architecture of such systems is proposed in [7] and a high level description is given in this section. The development of the scheduling service is considered in this framework.
The proposed system design consists of four tiers. Patients' health parameters are continuously being measured by wearable, unobtrusive sensors. The recorded measurements are then sent to and gathered by a base station. This is the second tier of the system and is part of the home equipment. It also represents a gateway towards the rest of the system. The base station can log and assess the measurements and request for a caregiver to be notified if a problem is detected. It also maintains patient-specific policies, which specify thresholds and actions for normal, alert and emergency conditions, and controls access to all the stored data according to these constraints.
The base station further communicates with a dispatch centre (DC), which can be a commercial organization that provides technical support and mediates the communication between the patients (i.e. the base stations) and the caregivers. It notifies caregivers of tasks assigned to them or in case of emergency situations and follows up on their responses 4 . It also relays the caregivers' requests to access the stored health-related data to the base stations. However, the complete exchange between patients and caregivers is encrypted, in order to protect the information from the dispatch centre and its staff.
Finally, a separate entity, namely the administration centre, handles administrative tasks, such as user registration. This functionality is separated from the dispatch centre for privacy reasons. Since the dispatch centre mediates communication between patients and their caregivers, combining that information with the identities of all users would reveal sensitive data. For instance, knowing a specialist that is treating the patient reveals information about the patient's health. Therefore, all the users are identified in the dispatch centre only by their pseudonyms, but can be identified by a deanonymizing authority using the registration transcripts, when certain conditions are fulfilled.
Both dispatch and administration centre are equipped with tamper-free devices (TD DC and TD AC , respectively). These trusted devices are used to re-key or decrypt (part of) sensitive information protected with their public key. These actions are possible only under certain conditions and are performed after strict checks. This is necessary to counter possible attacks and prevent leakage of private information. For a detailed description of the functioning of these trusted devices, we refer the reader to [7] .
System functionality
Initially, all parties need to register with the administration centre. Upon registration, patients obtain a smart card recording their identity, address information and the service level agreement (SLA). The card also generates two public/private key pairs, one to be used for encryption, the other for signing. The public keys are then certified by the administration centre and the certificates are stored on the card. Similarly, when the caregivers register, they receive an anonymous credential certifying their identity, address information, medical qualifications and related proofs and a chosen random value which is not disclosed to the administration centre. The random value is used to generate provable unlinkable pseudonyms. Both patients and caregivers are then able to register with the dispatch centre.
When a patient registers with the dispatch centre (DC), her personal network is created and identified with her randomly-looking pseudonym. Linked with this pseudonym are a vault, i.e. an encryption of her real identity and address information obtainable only by the TD DC , and a certificate issued by the TD DC , linking the patient's pseudonym with her public keys. The trusted device only re-encrypts the information from the vault with the public key of an authorized party, so that it remains hidden from all other entities. The same holds for the caregivers' nodes. A caregiver anonymously approaches the dispatch centre when he is invited to join a patient's network. He then creates a new pseudonym as a function of the patient's pseudonym and the (secret) random number recorded in his credential. This way, he can pseudonymously authenticate with the DC, proving that the pseudonym is generated using his credential. Also, his connections to multiple patients are unlinkable, as he is identified in each connection with a different pseudonym. Along with the caregiver's pseudonym, the DC stores his role in the patient's network 5 and a vault containing the identity, address, medical qualifications and appropriate proofs which only TD DC can decrypt. Additionally, the caregiver generates a new key pair to be used for communication with the patient he is connecting to and the public key is certified by the TD DC . The role that is specified (e.g. relative, neighbour, nurse) is used by the DC to perform coarse-grained access control, as all requests exchanged between the patient and her caregivers are mediated by the DC. For instance, a catering service or other commercial organizations cannot request to access the health related information kept in the base station. The second point of control is the base station itself, as it records and enforces the patient-specific policies.
Note that the creation of the policies does not need to be performed by the patient herself, but can be delegated to her guardian when the system is initially bootstrapped. These policies can be changed only by authorized members of the patient's network. The dispatch centre keeps the information about a patient's connections with her caregivers in the form of a network. These networks are patient-centric and both patients and caregivers are only identified with their pseudonyms. As one caregiver is represented with different pseudonyms in different patient's networks, linkability is avoided. This also protects against deducing sensitive information about a network if some information about other networks is disclosed.
Basic building blocks
In this section we describe the cryptographic building blocks that are used in the proposed scheduling protocols.
Encryption schemes. Both public and symmetric key cryptography are used in the protocols. We will use SymEnc/SymDec and AsymEnc/AsymDec to indicate symmetric (resp. public key) encryption/decryption and denote the corresponding keys as K and (P K Enc , SK Enc ). GenerateSymKey will represent the symmetric key generation function.
Signature scheme. These schemes, based on public key cryptography, are used for proving authenticity of a message. A prover uses its private key (SK Sig ) to create a signature on a message. The verifier can use the corresponding public key (P K Sig ) to verify that the signature was indeed created by the person holding the corresponding secret key. A certificate can link the public key with the identity or a pseudonym of the prover.
Hash functions. These one-way functions transform a variable-length bitstring to a hash value of a a fixed length. Given the hash, the probability of finding the original value is negligible.
Anonymous credentials. This type of digital credentials allows for selective disclosure of attributes recorded in them. They are issued by a trusted authority and besides proving possession of a valid credential or the embedded attributes, it is also possible to only prove the attribute properties, without disclosing their actual values. For instance, they allow a person to prove his age-range, without revealing the actual birthdate, which is embedded in the credential. Moreover, anonymous credentials can be used for signing a message (denoted as SignCred). Zero-knowledge proofs are used to prove possession of a valid credential and also to prove properties of the embedded attributes. This type of digital credentials also allows for accountability. This means that even when the communication is anonymous, a deanonymizer is able to reveal the identity of the user from the communication transcripts, when certain conditions hold (e.g. if abuse is detected). In the remainder of the text we will assume usage of the Idemix anonymous credentials [4] , which allow multiple credential shows to remain unlinkable.
Vaults. Some values that need to be stored securely are encrypted with a secret key obtainable only by a trusted entity, which may disclose them when certain conditions are fulfilled. These encrypted values are denoted as vaults.
Capsules. This term refers to a secret key (symmetric session or one-time key) possibly concatenated with additional information such as the identifiers (pseudonyms) of the sending and/or the receiving party, which is encrypted with the public key of the receiver. It is denoted as Cap RCVR .
Trusted devices. They are tamper free devices with limited functionality (such as encryption/decryption, issuing certificates) and are able to perform certain checks. Their code and secret data can be protected with a trusted platform module (TPM).
Assumptions. In the remainder of the text we will use the following assumptions about the creation of encrypted communication between two entities. All stakeholders in the system (patients and caregivers) interact via the dispatch centre. This communication is SSL protected with server-side (DC) authentication. The initiating party (most often a caregiver) first pseudonymously authenticates with the DC. Next, it generates a fresh symmetric key and puts it in a capsule for the receiving party, together with their two pseudonyms. The initiator's request (e.g. to access the patient's medical data) and the capsule are signed and sent to the DC over an SSL connection. The DC performs a coarse-grained access control based on the role of the sender. If the request is authorized, the DC will relay the messages to the receiver via the appropriate SSL channel. The receiving party then verifies the signature and extracts the session key from the capsule which is subsequently used for encrypting the communication between the two parties. We will refer to this establishment of encrypted communication between two parties as creation of a protected virtual link. Once this link is established, all the messages DC relays are hidden from it. In the protocols' illustrations in the following text, the exchange over the virtual link will be denoted as "(↔)". A similar approach is used when some data needs to be stored at the dispatch centre in order to make it available to different parties. The entity that is sending the data initially authenticates pseudonumoysly to the dispatch centre. It then generates a symmetric key with which it encrypts the data to be stored. The key is enclosed in a capsule along with the pseudonym of the sender and possibly the parties authorized to access the data. The capsule, Cap T D , is encrypted with the public key of TD DC . Both the encrypted data and the capsule are stored at the DC. The trusted device can make the protected data available to an authorized party by re-encrypting the capsule with this party's public key. However, this is only performed after thorough checks explained in the following text.
The scheduling service
The scheduling service allows for fair allocation of patient-requested tasks to their caregivers, making sure that every task is assigned and confirmed by a caregiver with appropriate qualifications. It also allows the patients to specify the preferred caregivers or undesired ones. Therefore, the scheduling is offered by the system as a service the patients can subscribe to. The scheduling service can be offered by an external entity that registers with the dispatch centre. A patient can request to connect to it if she wants to use its services. In that case, the scheduling service becomes one of the caregivers of her network with an appropriate role. That is also true if the scheduling is offered by the dispatch centre itself -it would join the patient's network as a provider of that service.
Patient's schedules
The base station of every patient maintains a schedule of the caregivers' tasks. For every task, the schedule contains its identifier, the time frame within which it should be performed, other details and the chosen caregiver. Until a caregiver confirms the assignment of a task, it remains conditional. For some tasks the base station will be able to choose a caregiver itself according to the patient's policies. Examples are the tasks that are recurrent and require a specific caregiver. For other tasks, the base station may request the scheduling service to assign them, i.e. to choose the appropriate caregivers. However, the information about the tasks and the caregivers that is communicated to the scheduling service needs to be limited. The protocols regarding creation of the schedules, assigning the tasks and retrieval of assignments are explained further in this section.
Caregiver's profiles
In order to allow the scheduling service to be deployed in the system, caregivers specify their availability and store this information in a profile at the dispatch centre. They update this information regularly and the base stations or the scheduling service are able to retrieve the latest versions when a task needs to be assigned. The profiles are linked with the caregiver's pseudonym and are stored encrypted with a secret key 6 with an appropriate capsule appended to it.
Besides the availability, the profiles contain other information relevant for task assignment. They also state the caregivers' willingness to perform certain tasks and how long in advance they need to be assigned with a task before it has to be performed. This way of maintaining and storing caregiver's profiles eases possible transition between different scheduling providers. Additionally, there is no information stored at the provider.
For creating and updating his profile at the dispatch centre, the caregiver uses a web application. Pseudonymous authentication is required to prove authorization to make changes to it. In order to avoid linkability, if a caregiver is connected to multiple patients, the application creates and sends a separate update (which can be the same or be different) for each of his patient-specific pseudonyms 7 . Additionally, in order to avoid timing attacks, the updates of the availability should not be performed at the same time for each of the pseudonyms. Furthermore, a caregiver can also specify different schedules for different patients he is connected to. For instance, if the patients are living in different areas of the country, this would allow him to adapt the availability information for each of them according to his planned mobility.
Scheduling a task
If one or more tasks need to be assigned to the caregivers of a patient, the base station sends a request to the scheduling service via the dispatch centre (DC). The steps of the protocol are illustrated in table 1. For every task, the base station (BS) creates task-assignment request containing the specified task, the time frame (TF), the required caregiver's role and/or qualifications and preferred or undesired pseudonyms, and signs it with the patient's smart card (SC PT ). This request is sent via a protected virtual link (cfr. Sect. 4). It is then used by the scheduling service (SS) to prove its authorization to retrieve the profiles of the concerned caregivers. After verifications, the trusted device reveals the profiles' encryption keys to SS. If special qualifications are necessary for a task, the SS can prompt TD DC whether a particular caregiver has these qualifications. The TD DC will check the caregiver's vault and reply Yes or No. When the scheduling provider obtains the profiles, it can assign the task, taking into account the required role of the caregiver and patient's preferences. Additionally, along with the initial request, the base station sends to the scheduling service relevant policies which are to be taken into account. Examples are limitation of hours that can be assigned to a role or a caregiver, restrictions on using commercial providers and additional requirements. In order to ensure a fair distribution of tasks, the base station also sends a summary (e.g. total number of hours) of current and past assignments to each of the caregivers. This way, the scheduling service can consider the load that is placed on each of the caregivers.
The assignments are then sent via a protected virtual link to the base station. The task assignments are now stored in the schedule, but remain conditional until the assigned caregiver approves the task. However, if the base station receives a refusal of a task, it will create a new specification for the task, noting that this caregiver is not a possibility and assign the task itself or via the scheduling service. It is also possible that a task would simply be cancelled, depending on the policies (cfr. further). 
The base station can also request the profiles of the caregivers, when it wants to assign a task itself. There is no need to employ the scheduling service for assigning tasks that are regularly performed by a specific caregiver. The base station will simply request from the TD DC the appropriate capsules to open the caregivers' profiles.
If a caregiver is a commercial organization (such as a catering or cleaning service provider) or has many patients he is connected to, he can be allowed to be self-scheduling. This means that he receives a task that is assigned to him, but is able to choose the time himself. The patient is able to suggest a limited number of possible time frames, one of which is chosen.
The scheduling subsystem also allows for task prioritization (which tasks need to be re-assigned and which may be cancelled) and assignment of standby caregivers (in case a caregiver cannot keep an appointment).
Retrieval of assignments
Every caregiver is assumed to be collecting his assignments at regular intervals (e.g. twice a week) via a web application. This dedicated application eases the use of the system for the caregivers. Initially, it establishes a protected virtual link with the base station of the patient. It then retrieves the tasks for which the caregiver's pseudonym (PN CG ) was assigned in order to inspect them (table  2) . The caregiver (CG) can then reply and accept or reject the assignments. Subsequently, the web application needs to make changes to the availability information specified in his profile. For this, it authenticates pseudonymously to the DC, sends the new profile signed with his anonymous credential, and receives a receipt from the DC. This way, if a problem is detected, the DC can prove that the schedule was received from the caregiver, and on the other hand, the caregiver can also prove whether or not a version of the profile was sent by him. 
However, when a caregiver wants to retrieve his complete profile, which might be the case if he is using the web application from a new device, strict checks are necessary. First, he will pseudonymously authenticate to the DC using his anonymous credential. The DC then asks the TD DC to verify whether the pseudonym matches the one in the capsule. If this verification passes, the TD DC constitutes a Cap CG with the encryption key extracted from the original Cap T D PN CG . This way, only owners of the profiles are able to retrieve them.
Contacting a caregiver
In case of emergency situations, a caregiver is urgently required to assist the patient. In this case, the base station chooses a caregiver, according to the patient's policies. The scheduling service is not involved and hence, no valuable time is lost. When a caregiver is chosen, the base station sends a request to the dispatch centre to contact the caregiver (table 3) . The request is not readable by the DC and is relayed to the calling module (CM). The module then sends the specified message to the caregiver's phone number. This number is extracted by the TD DC after appropriate checks, from the caregiver's vault stored at the DC. For communication with the calling module, a symmetric key is used. This key is embedded in the module through whitebox cryptography. Once the message has been sent, the calling module will store the patient's pseudonym and a secure hash of the telephone number and delete any other information to protect from eavesdroppers. This hash is then compared to the incoming messages' origin. If the expected response is received, the calling module sends it encrypted to the base station.
It is important to note that every assignment of a task is logged at the base station, along with the pseudonym of the caregiver and his response. This is necessary for handling disputes and protecting the patients, since they do not need to examine the way tasks are scheduled and the replies of the caregiver, as it is automated by the system. Therefore, if a caregiver continuously refuses tasks or cancels them in a non-timely manner, the patient may need to be warned. Table 3 . Contacting a caregiver
One of the most important requirements posed on a scheduling mechanism in eHealth systems is protecting the privacy of both patients and caregivers. Not only the identifying information needs to be hidden from unauthorized parties. Some information such as specific qualifications of caregivers or certain requirements regarding tasks to be allocated can lead to deducing the health status of the patient as well. Therefore, in this paper we evaluate the security and privacy of the proposed protocols. In this paper, we only focus on the properties of the scheduling service. The general mechanisms that ensure security and privacy in eHealth systems are presented in [7] . In the described system, the identifying information of the patients and the caregivers is stored at the dispatch centre, which makes it available to authorized entities. The caregivers' profiles recording information relevant for the scheduling are kept in the same way. For security reasons, they are stored encrypted and are only accessible to the TD DC . Moreover, since the profiles are not encrypted in a deterministic way, it is not apparent which profiles or availabilities are the same. Therefore, an external attacker with no legitimate access rights is not able to see any sensitive data, even if he succeeds in downloading the complete database of the DC. However, he can try to obtain sensitive data by sending a forged request and posing as an authorized party. This kind of attack can also originate from the dispatch centre's staff. As it is assumed to be a commercial company, its staff is not allowed to obtain access to any sensitive data. This attack is countered, as the trusted device re-keys the stored information only after thorough checks -for re-encrypting capsules related to caregivers profiles, it also checks whether the patient has authorized the scheduling service to access this data via a signed request. The signature is verified with the patient's public key, certified by the administration centre. Therefore, no other parties are able retrieve the profile information, even by trying to forge the request -they can neither provide the signature made with the patient's key, nor sign the data with the key that is not certified. Additionally, external entities are not able to intercept and see the request that is sent by the patient, as it is sent to the scheduling service via a protected virtual link (cfr. Sect 4).
The staff of the scheduling service can also be observed as a possible threat. The service is offered by a commercial company, which is only allowed to see limited amount of data, necessary for optimal scheduling of tasks -caregivers' pseudonyms, qualifications, availability and preferences regarding tasks. It should not be able to persuade the TD DC to reveal more profiles than specified by the base station. That is ensured by the patient's signature which secures the specification of the caregivers' pseudonyms that can be assigned to the task.
Finally, a possible attack that needs to be countered is the one originating from both the dispatch centre and the scheduling service. If these two parties collude, they are in fact only able to see the data that the scheduling service obtains combined with the roles of caregivers that are specified in the request. However, this does not reveal any additional data -the roles provide only a high level description of the qualification of a person, and the scheduling requests do not contain detailed information about the tasks that are assigned. That is only communicated to the caregivers directly from the base station. The knowledge of the DC, namely the connections between patients and caregivers, are already apparent from the request.
Regarding the security of the protocols, it is important to ensure that all the requested tasks are allocated and that the caregiver's responses are not modified. This is fulfilled as the caregivers are responding to their assignments directly to the base station over a protected virtual channel, where the communication is authenticated. Therefore, an attacker is prevented from modifying the exchanged data undetected. In case a required response is missing, the base station may alert the patient or a designated caregiver, depending on the patient's policies. It is also important to make sure that the stored profiles are not forged. Since the caregivers are authenticating pseudonymously when uploading a profile, the DC is able to detect an attack. On the other hand, the DC's staff are not able to make up a new schedule and plant it undetected, since the caregiver receives a receipt, proving which profile he sent.
Conclusion
In this paper we have described a scheduling mechanism that can be integrated into a pervasive eHealth system. The protocols regarding this service are described in detail and the focus of the design was preserving privacy of patients, but also their caregivers. Furthermore, the disclosure of information is performed on a need-to-know basis allowing the service to be offered by a commercial company, which is an important impetus for its deployment on a large scale. Based on these assumptions, possible attacks on the security and privacy are evaluated for different attackers' models. With the given assessment of the protocols, we can conclude that the described mechanism ensures all the privacy and security requirements of a scheduling service. It also allows this service to be offered by the dispatch centre without any emerging privacy issues.
